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Pendent Jurisdiction In Diversity
Cases -- Some Doubts
DARRELL D. BRATTON*
The Supreme Court has twice espoused the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction whereby a federal court may adjudicate a claim arising
under state law which does not meet the ordinary federal jurisdic-
tional requirements when that state claim is properly joined with
a federal claim and both claims are based on a common core of
facts.' Those two cases involved clearly federal claims of copy-
right infringement2 and secondary boycott 3 to which were ap-
pended state claims of unfair competition and interference with
contract rights respectively. In both cases, the joined claims were
asserted by a single plaintiff against a single defendant between
whom there was no diversity of citizenship.
Perhaps because of the parallelism of these two Supreme Court
decisions, it has long been assumed that pendent jurisdiction is
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego. A.B., Butler Univ.
(1960); LL.B., Duke Univ. (1963). The author wishes to express his
appreciation to Craig Walker, student, University of San Diego School of
Law, for his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as UMW v. Gibbs]: Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
2. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
3. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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available only in similar cases.4 In recent years, however, some
district courts and courts of appeals have expanded markedly the
application of pendent jurisdiction. They have permitted the ap-
pending of claims by and against additional parties not involved in
the federal claim,5 and they have extended pendent jurisdiction to
diversity cases.6 It is the object of this article to examine the princi-
4. W. BARRON AND A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §23(Wright ed. 1960); 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE f 18.07 [1] (2d ed. 1970);
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or FEDERAL COURTS §19 (2d ed. 1970)[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS].
5. Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971);
Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971)(alternative ground). See Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Ju-
risdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to
Persons not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claim, 73 COLUm. L. REV.
153 (1973).
6. Decisions by U.S. circuits: Third Circuit: Jacobson v. Atlantic City
Hospital, 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Greene v. Basti, 391 F.2d 892 (3d
Cir. 1968); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir.
1966); Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964); Fahrner v.
Gentzsch, 355 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Townsend v. Quality Court
Motels, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Del. 1972); Campbell v. Triangle Corp.,
336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1972), reconsidered and vacated 56 F.R.D. 480;
Obney v. Schmalzreid, 273 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Newman v.
Freeman, 262 F. Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Morris v. Gimbel Bros., Inc.,
246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Fourth Circuit: Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d
94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1000 (1972), reh. den. 409 U.S. 1118(1973); Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F. Supp. 460 (S.D. W. Va. 1967); Sixth Cir-
cuit: Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970);
General Research, Inc. v. American Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735
(W.D. Mich. 1968); Wiggs v. City of Tullahoma, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.D.
Tenn. 1966); Raybould v. Mancini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (ED.
Mich. 1960); Seventh Circuit: Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago
Title & Trust Co., 261 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. 111. 1966); Eighth Circuit: Hat-
ridge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Lucas
v. Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp. 338 (D. Minn. 1967); Dixon v. North-
western Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 276 F. Supp. 96 (D. Minn. 1967);
Ninth Circuit: Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppeson & Co., 344 F.
Supp. 1381 (D. Nev. 1972).
Contra authority in the post-Gibbs era exists: Third Circuit: Seyler v.
Steuben Motors, Inc., 462 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1972) (distinguishes Borror,
Wilson, and Newman, supra.); Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.
Pa. 1968) (distinguishes Borror, Wilson, and Newman, supra); Fifth Cir-
cuit: Redden v. Cincinnati, Inc., 347 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Robi-
son v. Castello, 331 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. La. 1971); Lawes v. Nutter, 292 F.
Supp. 890 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Campbell v. City of Atlanta, Fulton County,
277 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ga. 1967); Sixth Circuit: Ciaramitaro v. Woods,
324 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (distinguishes Reybould and General
Research, Inc., supra); Seventh Circuit: Sherrell v. Mitchell Aero, Inc.,
340 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Ninth Circuit: Hymer v. Chai, 407
pal impediments which lie in the path of this latter extension of the
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.
THE DOcTRME AS ESTABLISHED BY THE SUPREMvE COURT
The Supreme Court's decision in Hum v. Oursler 7 is the founda-
tion upon which the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has been built.
In that case, the plaintiff sued to enjoin the public production and
performance of a play which he alleged infringed upon his own
play existing in both copyrighted and uncopyrighted form. He
'also sought damages and an accounting. Plaintiff alleged further
that the defendant's acts constituted unfair business practices and
unfair competition. These latter allegations were of state law torts.
The trial court found that there was no infringement of the copy-
righted version of plaintiff's play and dismissed the remaining
claims for lack of jurisdiction as they were not based upon viola-
tions of the copyright law and there was no diversity of citizenship
between the parties.8 The court of appeals affirmed,9 and the Su-
preme Court affirmed with modifications.
The Court noted the confusion which existed among the lower
courts as to the question of jurisdiction to entertain unfair compe-
tition claims along with copyright infringement claims and re-
solved the controversy in favor of pendent jurisdiction. The Court,
perceiving the issue as one of the judicial power of the federal
courts, quoted from Osborn v. United States Bank:10
We think, then that when a question to which the judicial power of
the Union is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of
the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit
Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact
or of law may be involved in it."1
The Court later cautioned, however:
But the rule does not go so far as to permit a federal court to as-
sume jurisdiction of a separate and distinct non-federal cause of
action because it is joined in the same complaint with a federal
cause of action. The distinction to be observed is between a case
where two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action
are alleged, one only of which presents a federal question, and
a case where two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged,
one only of which is federal in character. In the former, where
F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969). See Comment, Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity
Cases, 30 U. PITT. L. R y. 607 (1969) which discusses the developments in
the Third Circuit.
7. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
8. Id. at 240.
9. 61 F.2d 1031 (2d Cir. 1932).
10. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
11. Hun v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238, 243 (1933).
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the federal question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the
federal court, even though the federal ground be not established,
may nevertheless retain and dispose of the case upon the non-
federal ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the non-fed-
eral cause of action.1 2
For purposes of determining the bounds between state and fed-
eral jurisdiction under this test, the Court defined a cause of ac-
tion as "'... the violation of but one right by a single legal
wrong... ' 13
These various tests were found to be satisfied in Hum. As to
the copyrighted version of plaintiff's play, the allegations both of
infringement and of unfair competition showed the violation of a
single right-the right to protection of the copyrighted play. "In-
deed, the claims of infringement and unfair competition so pre-
cisely rest upon identical fact as to be little more than the equiva-
lent of different epithets to characterize the same group of circum-
stances."'14 Hence, they were but different legal theories asserted in
support of the same cause of action.
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 5 Mr. Justice Brennan, speak-
ing for the Court,' 6 criticized the Hum approach as "unneces-
sarily grudging" and laid out a new fohndation on which a greater
edifice of federal pendent jurisdiction is being built. That case in-
volved allegations of unlawful secondary boycotts under § 303 of
the Labor Management Relations Act1 7 and of actionable interfer-
.ence with contracts of employment and haulage under state law.
The controversy arose out of a strike which shut down a coal mine
at which plaintiff was the superintendent and from which he had
a contract to haul coal. On appeal from an award of damages for
interference with the employment relationship, the Supreme Court
upheld the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the state law claim
but reversed on other grounds.
The Court reformulated the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as
follows:
12. Id. at 245-46.
13. Id. at 246, quoting from Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S.
316, 321 (1927).
14. Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933).
15. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
16. On the question of pendent jurisdiction, the Court was unanimous.
The Chief Justice did not participate, however.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1964).
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists when-
ever there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
der their Authority. .. " U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the rela-
tionship between that claim and the state claim permits the con-
clusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional "case". The federal claim must have substance suf-
ficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. [citation
omitted] The state and federal claims must derive from a com-
mon nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard
to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that
he would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues,
there is power in the federal courts to hear the whole.' 8 [footnotes
omitted]
Having thus established the basis for pendent jurisdiction, the
Court added that it ". . . is a doctrine of discretion, not of plain-
tiff's right ...[and that the] power need not be exercised in every
case in which it is found to exist."'19 "Its justification lies in con-
siderations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants ... ,,20
QUEsTIoNs OF APPLICABILITY TO DIVERSITY CASES
The reference in Gibbs to judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants, together with the retraction of the strict single
cause of action limitation of Hum, has led some lower federal
courts to apply pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases.21 Some sig-
nificant differences exist, however, between the doctrine of pend-
ent jurisdiction as applied in Hum and Gibbs and as applied in a
diversity case. First, both Hum, and Gibbs were federal question
cases, and, as will be discussed, there may be strong federal inter-
ests in asserting pendent jurisdiction in cases arising under federal
law which do not exist in diversity cases arising under state law.22
Second, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, as stated by the Su-
preme Court, is expressly premised on the presence of a "substan-
tial federal question" sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court.23
Such a question is not present in a suit based solely upon diversity.
The third, and perhaps most important difference, is made apparent
18. UIMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
19. Id. at 726.
20. Id.
21. See note 6, supra.
22. See Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 1968); For-
tune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1972).
23. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Hun v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238, 243, 245-46 (1933). See text at note 18, supra. This may be simply a
result of the fact that those cases involved federal questions.
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by considering the circumstances inherent in the use of pendent
jurisdiction in any diversity case.
Pendent jurisdiction might be invoked in a diversity case in three
situations: first, where two or more plaintiffs sue a single de-
fendant on separate claims, but one plaintiff has the same citizen-
ship as the defendant;24 or where one plaintiff sues two or more
defendants on several liabilities and diversity is lacking as to one
defendant;2 5 second, where several plaintiffs assert separate claims
against a defendant of diverse citizenship but one of the claims is
for less than $10,000;26 and third, where both diversity of citizen-
ship and the minimum amount in controversy are lacking as to
one of several independent claims. It will be seen that in all of
these situations, as in federal question cases, the use of pendent
jurisdiction will permit the federal court to adjudicate some claims
which would not be cognizable in that court if sued upon sep-
arately; but in the diversity case, the exercise of pendent jurisdic-
24. E.g., Obney v. Schmalzreid, 273 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (Suit
was brought by a foreign guardian of a Pennsylvania minor for personal
injuries to the minor and by the minor's parents for medical expenses
paid on account of the minor's injuries. There was no diversity between
the parents and defendant, but pendent jurisdiction was allowed.); Olivieri
v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (Pendent jurisdiction denied
as to parents' claims for damages in suits by foreign guardians for per-
sonal injuries to minors); Lawes v. Nutter, 292 F. Supp. 890 (S.D. Tex.
1968) (Plaintiff who lacked diversity as to defendant was not permitted tojoin his claim for personal injuries with a wrongful death claim by the
foreign administrator of plaintiff's wife's estate).
25. E.g., Campbell v. Triangle Corporation, 336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D.
Pa.) reconsidered and vacated, 56 F.R.D. 480 (1972).
As for claims by multiple plaintiffs against multiple defendants as to
some of whom diversity is lacking, see Seyler v. Steuben Motors, Inc.,
462 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1972) (pendent jurisdiction denied); Borror v. Sharon
Steel Co., 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964) (pendent jurisdiction asserted as
alternative ground); Sherrell v. Mitchell Aero, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 219
(E.D. Wis. 1971) (consolidation refused); Newman v. Freeman, 262 F.
Supp. 106 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (pendent jurisdiction applied to father's claim
for medical expenses and loss of services joined with claim by foreign
guardian for personal injuries to the child).
26. E.g., Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969) (pendent jurisdic-
tion denied as to wife's $7,500 claim for loss of consortium joined with
husband's claim of $75,000 for personal injuries); Hatridge v. Aetna Casu-
alty & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (pendent jurisdiction ap-
plied as to wife's claim for $9,999.99 for loss of consortium-alternative
ground). As for a single plaintiff suing multiple defendants, see e.g.,
Stone v. Stone, 460 F.2d 64 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000
(1972) (pendent jurisdiction applied).
tion will always entail joinder of an additional plaintiff or defend-
ant who is not a party to any claim which meets federal jurisdic-
tional requirements, either because he is not diverse from his op-
posing party or because the separate and distinct claim by or
against him does not satisfy the minimum amount in controversy.
It is this inevitable joinder of parties which raises doubts as to
the propriety of exercising pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases.
If the party joined on the non-federally qualified claim is not of
diverse citizenship from his opposing party, there is a direct con-
frontation with the rule of complete diversity. Even if he is of
diverse citizenship, if the claim to which he is a party does not meet
the minimum amount in controversy requirement, there is an ap-
parent conflict with the rule against aggregation of separate and
distinct claims of multiple parties.
The impact of these latter two rules upon the availability of
pendent jurisdiction will be considered separately.
A. Complete Diversity
Article HI of the Constitution gives Congress the power to de-
fine the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. 27 Since the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,28 Congress has chosen to give the federal courts
jurisdiction over actions between a citizen of one state and a citizen
of another state.29
From its first construction of the general diversity statute in
1806,30 the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that all of the
parties on one side of a controversy must be citizens of a different
state or states from all of the parties on the other side.31 This is
the rule of complete diversity.
27. "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The power to
create inferior courts has been construed to include the authority to
give them so much of the federal judicial power as Congress sees fit.
See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 235 (1845); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 10.
28. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
29. The current provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (1970):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-(1) citizens of different States;(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or sub-jects thereof; and(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or
citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
30. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
31. E.g. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939); Sweeney v.
Carter Oil Co., 199 U.S. 252 (1905).
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The following discussion will proceed on the -assumption that
pendent jurisdiction is being sought solely because of lack of di-
versity of citizenship as to one of several joined claims.
1. The Constitutional Question
The power of the federal courts to entertain non-federal3 2 claims
must be found, if at all, in Article III of the Constitution. 83 The
Supreme Court has found that power in the authority granted to
hear certain cases by that article. If, as the decision in Gibbs indi-
cates, the Court's definition of a constitutional "case" includes all
claims which "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact"34
so as to extend federal jurisdiction to related state claims in federal
question suits, it is difficult to deny the same jurisdiction to hear
related non-diverse claims in a diversity suit. It is the factual basis
of the claims, not their legal source or party involvement, which
defines the constitutional case under this test.
One might argue that "controversies ... between Citizens of
different States . . ."35 is a more restrictive concept than "[c] ases
* . .arising under ... the Laws of the United States. . .,3 in that
it specifically relates to the parties rather than to the source of the
claims asserted. But the Supreme Court's approval of minimal
diversity in statutory interpleader actions makes it clear that the
usual requirement of complete diversity between all adverse par-
ties is the result of statutory construction and not constitutional
32. The term "non-federal" claims is used to denote all claims which do
not independently satisfy federal jurisdictional requirements. A claim is
non-federal in this sense, although it arises under federal law, if it does not
involve the requisite amount in controversy.
33. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min-
isters and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a
Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between
a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of differ-
ent States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
34. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
35. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
36. Id.
imperative.3 7 Thus, the presence of some non-diverse, adverse
parties in a diversity action is not constitutionally fatal to jurisdic-
tion.
The conclusion seems inescapable that, from a constitutional
standpoint, the term "controversy" is broad enough to permit in-
clusion in a single suit of multiple related claims some of which
do not exist between diverse parties. This is but another way of
describing pendent jurisdiction.
2. Statutory Considerations
As stated earlier, the rule of complete diversity has been derived
from the statutes conferring general diversity jurisdiction upon the
federal courts.38
There are, of course, exceptions to the complete diversity re-
quirement. One of these is statutory interpleader under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1335(a).39 But since it is a legislatively created excep-
37. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
38. See text at note 31, supra.
39. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader filed by
any person, firm, or corporation, association, or society having in
his or its custody or possession money or property of the value of$500 or more, or having issued a note, bond, certificate, policy
of insurance, or other instrument of value or amount of $500 or
more, or providing for the delivery or payment or the loan of
money or property of such amount or value, or being under any
obligation written or unwritten to the amount of $500 or more, if(1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as
defined in section 1332 of this title, are claiming or may claim to
be entitled to such money or property, or to any one or more of
the benefits arising by virtue of any note, bond, certificate, policy
or other instrument, or arising by virtue of any such obligation;
and if (2) the plaintiff has deposited such money or property or
has paid the amount of or the loan or other value of such instru-
ment or the amount due under such obligation into the registry of
the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, or has given
bond payable to the clerk of court in such amount and with such
surety as the court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon
the compliance by the plaintiff with the future order or judgment
of the court with respect to the subject matter of the controversy.
This is an instance when a state court may be unable to obtain personaljurisdiction over all of the adverse claimants, and hence be unable to pro-
tect the stakeholder from double liability. See New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916). Because the federal courts are permitted
nationwide service of process in statutory interpleader cases (28 U.S.C. §
2361), they have a unique role to play in assuring fairness to the stake-
holder in such circumstances.
The American Law Institute proposes to make use of this unique attri-
bute of federal jurisdiction by giving the district courts original and re-
moval jurisdiction of actions in which all of the parties "necessary for just
adjudication" are not subject to the authority of a single state court. See
ALI, STUDY OF THE DMsioN OF JuRisDIcTIoN BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CounTs §§ 2371, 2373 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY].
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tion, its very existence reinforces the position that § 1332, the gen-
eral diversity provision, requires complete diversity. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has asserted that interpleader actions pursu-
ant to Rule 22,40 by contrast, do depend upon complete diversity.4 1
The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1941(c) 4 2 for removal to federal
courts of entire cases when only one of several separate and inde-
pendent claims is within the original jurisdiction of the district
courts is another instance where less than complete diversity is
acceptable for federal jurisdiction. Indeed, it can be viewed as a
Congressional adoption of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction as
it expressly permits trial in the district courts of non-federal
claims. 43 However, this provision is another Congressionally man-
dated exception to the ordinary rule of § 1332. It may also be dis-
tinguished because it concerns removal jurisdiction rather than
original jurisdiction, and pendent jurisdiction has always been re-
garded as a doctrine of original jurisdiction.44
The practice with regard to class actions might be thought to
support the existence of pendent jurisdiction in diversity actions.
One of the acknowledged attributes of a proceeding under Rule
23 is that a large group of persons with state-created claims in-
volving common questions of law or fact may invoke the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts, despite the fact that some members of
the class have the same citizenship as the opposing party, so long
as the citizenships of the named representatives are completely
40. The word "Rule" is used in this article to refer to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
41. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 528-29
n.3 (1967).
42. Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one
or more otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the
entire case may be removed and the district court may determine
all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not
otherwise within its original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1941(c)(1970).
43. In fact, it goes beyond the pendent jurisdiction concept of Gibbs
because it allows removal of state claims which are unrelated to the fed-
eral claim. This result has been sustained on the basis of minimal diver-
sity. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965). This section and the questions of constitutionality and statu-
tory construction which it raises are discussed in C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
COURTS § 39.
44. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238 (1933).
diverse from the opponent's.45 This is, in actuality, appending
non-diverse claims to proper diversity claims, but, in theory, it is
not. Theoretically, complete diversity is preserved by the simple
expedient of looking only to the citizenship of the representatives
as if they were the only parties in interest.46 This same reference
to the citizenship of the representative for jurisdictional purposes
has been made in cases involving trustees47 and executors48 suing
for the ultimate benefit of non-diverse beneficiaries or legatees, al-
though there is a backing away from this practice in these cases
because of the potential for collusive creation of diversity jurisdic-
tion.40 The point is that even in representative actions obeisance
is paid to the complete diversity rule of § 1332.
A strong argument for pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases
may be found in the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in such
cases.60 In fact, the Hurn decision relied in part on the decision
in Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange,51 which concerned ancillary
jurisdiction over a non-federal counterclaim. The Court went so
far as to say that the two questions cannot be distinguished in
principle.52
This is true as to hearing additional claims between the original
parties, whether they are joined claims or are compulsory coun-
terclaims or cross-claims When parties are already before the court
to litigate certain factual and legal issues, it is eminently reason-
able to permit them to settle before that court, in one trial if pos-
sible, all of the claims existing between or among themselves in-
volving those same issues. Furthermore, these circumstances are
within the language of § 1332 since they involve only parties over
45. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921). Some
doubt may have been cast upon this settled proposition by the recent de-
cision in Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973), which
said that the claim of every member of the class must meet the $10,000
minimum amount requirement. As the dissenters suggest in Zahn, it is
difficult to understand why the ultimately constitutional requirement of
diversity may be satisfied by reference to the citizenship of the represen-
tatives only, but the purely statutory requirement of a minimum amount
in controversy may not. Zahn at 516. The present practice might be
preserved by invoking the concept of minimal diversity in class actions.
46. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921).
47. E.g., Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172 (1870).
48. E.g., Childress v. Emery, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 641, 669 (1923).
49. E.g., Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 975 (1970). See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1970).
50. Pendent jurisdiction is distinguished from ancillary jurisdiction on
the basis that pendent claims are original claims included in plaintiff's
complaint while ancillary claims are asserted in subsequent pleadings and
usually by other parties.
51. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
52. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 242 (1933).
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whom the court originally had jurisdiction and do not affect the
pre-existing diversity of citizenship. 53
However, new parties may be added to the litigation through
counterclaims, 54 cross-claims, 55 third-party complaints,-0 or inter
vention. 57 If these new parties are not of diverse citizenship from
their opposing parties and the claims asserted by or against them
do not arise under federal law, then there is a question of federal
jurisdiction to entertain these claims.
Courts generally agree that ancillary jurisdiction applies to such
claims when asserted as compulsory counterclaims, 58 cross-claims, 5
or third-party complaints, 0 despite the lack of diversity or $10,000
amount in controversy. Such universal agreement is difficult to
gainsay. Furthermore, it is unnecessary to refute these authorities
in order to maintain the position that pendent jurisdiction is un-
available in diversity cases, for these are all instances of responses
made by parties already brought within the jurisdiction of the
court after satisfaction of ordinary jurisdictional requirements61
Once presence of the original parties in a federal court has been
justified, it seems appropriate to hold that the court's jurisdiction
over the controversy before it includes the authority to do com-
plete justice between them in regard to the matters to be tried,
although it may require the presence of other persons. In this
sense, the presence of the additional parties is truly ancillary to
the original controversy.
So far as counterclaims and cross-claims are concerned, the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure require that an original party be in-
53. It may be significant that in Hum, and Gibbs the non-federal claims
were also asserted between the original parties.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b), & (h).
55. FED. R. Crv. P. 13 (g) & (h).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
58 See cases cited in 3 J. MoomR, FEDERAL PRACTICE % 13.39, n.22 (2d ed,
1972); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDEAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 1436, n.83 (1971) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT I & MILLER].
59. See cases cited in WRIGHT & MILLER § 1436, n.84.
60. See cases cited in 3 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.26, n.6 (2d ed.
1972); WRIGHT & MILLER § 1444, nn.69 & 70.
61. Cross-claims cannot be asserted between co-plaintiffs except in re-
sponse to counterclaim or a claim by a third-party defendant or intervener.
For distinction between pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction,
see note 50, supra.
cluded as a counter-defendant or cross-defendant.6 2 This makes it
clear that these additional claims are an integral part of and nec-
essary to the complete resolution of (i.e., ancillary to) the contro-
versy between the original parties which is already before the
court. This essential relationship to the existing controversy be-
tween the original parties is not so clear as to third-party com-
plaints, but may exist by virtue of the nature of the third-party
claim which is dependent upon the determination of the claim be-
tween the original parties and results in reimbursement to the de-
fendant for liability incurred to the plaintiff.63 When, on the
other hand, additional non-diverse plaintiffs or defendants are
joined in a complaint simply because their claims or liabilities de-
rive from a "common nucleus of operative fact", their presence is
not ordinarily "truly ancillary" in the same sense, in that they are
not essential to the complete resolution of the controversy be-
tween the diverse parties.
Intervention, the fourth means of injecting new parties into
an existing suit, presents a different situation. It entails the as-
sertion of a claim or defense by a new party on his own behalf
and on his own initiative rather than being brought in by the
original parties. For that reason, the question of whether the in-
tervener's presence is truly ancillary involves other considerations.
The generally accepted rule is that ancillary jurisdiction applies
to claims of intervention as of right under Rule 24(a), but not to
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b).64
According to Rule 24(a), one has a right to intervene:
(1) [W]hen a statute of the United States confers an uncondi-
tional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an in-
terest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action
may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately repre-
sented by existing parties.
If a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to
intervene there can be no question but that the court has jurisdic-
tion over the claim regardless of diversity or amount since that is
a specific statutory exception to the general jurisdictional provi-
sion.
As to persons coming within subdivision (2) of the rule, how-
ever, there is no such pat answer. If the intervener asserts a joint
62. FED. R. Crv. P. 13 (h).
63. See WRIGHT & MILLER § 1446.
64. See 3B J. MooRE, FEDEAL PAcriCEC 24.18[1] (2d ed. 1969);
WRIGHT & MILLER § 1917.
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right, or a defense to a joint liability, his claim is not simply an-
cillary to the original controversy, rather it is part of it. In such
a case, the intervener must fairly be regarded as an original party
for purposes of determining whether the suit is properly in fed-
eral court. The same regard should be given to the intervener's cit-
izenship whenever he is found to be indispensable to the determi-
nation of the original controversy, whether his interest is joint or
several in relation to the original parties. The result is essen-
tially a finding that he should have been an original party. When,
however, his original joinder would have defeated federal jurisdic-
tion, to permit ancillary jurisdiction over his claim or defense
would be to violate through indirection the jurisdictional limita-
tions on joinder of parties. The cases generally hold that the court
loses jurisdiction in these circumstances.6 5
Anomalously, the courts have generally invoked ancillary juris-
diction to permit an intervener as of right under Rule 24(a) (2)
who does not meet the ordinary jurisdictional requirements but
who is not indispensable to come into court without disturbing the
court's jurisdiction.6 6 Since he may be prejudiced as a practical
matter by disposition of the action in his absence, it is plausible
to regard his claim or defense as ancillary to the original contro-
versy. Further, because he did not have to be joined as a party
originally, it is possible to disregard the fact that he could not have
been joined.67
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, appear to pre-
clude the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction under Rule 24(a) (2).
65. See cases cited in WRIGHT & MILEm § 1917, n.65. The opinion of the
Supreme Court in Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public UtiUs. Comm'n, 260
U.S. 48 (1922), implies that this is the correct rule. Argument was made
that the intervention of a non-diverse defendant destroyed jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Taft said:
Much less is such jurisdiction defeated by the intervention, by
leave of the court, of a party whose presence is not essential to a
decision of the controversy between the original parties .... The
Kansas Company, while it had an interest and was a proper party,
was not an indispensable party.
Id. at 54.
66. See excellent discussion in WRIGHT & MILLER § 1917.
67. See Drumwright v. Texas Sugarland Co., 16 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.
1927), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 749 (1927), in which a non-diverse plaintiff
was dismissed from a foreclosure action and then permitted to return to
the action by way of intervention.
This for the reason that the language of Rule 24(a) (2) was pur-
posely made parallel to that of Rule 19(a) defining persons to be
joined if feasible, with the apparent intent of allowing condition-
ally necessary or indispensable parties to bring themselves into a
law suit when the original parties have seen fit to omit them.68
But such conditionally necessary or indispensable parties should
not be permitted to intervene without meeting the general juris-
dictional requirements, because Rule 19(a) indicates that these
people should have been original parties. 69 Allowing them to in-
tervene by assertion of ancillary jurisdiction is a subversion of the
jurisdictional limitations of § 1332.
Rule 19 makes the point clearly. Rule 19(a) requires joinder of
persons described therein (and in Rule 24(a) (2)) only if their
joinder "will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action." Rule 19(b) provides that if such persons
cannot be made parties, the court must decide whether to go on
without them or to dismiss the action entirely.70 In other words,
the rule concedes that these omitted persons cannot be made part
of the action when their presence would destroy diversity and that
the only determination left for the court in such a case is whether
in equity and good conscience it can proceed without them. To al-
low such persons to slip in through the back door by way of inter-
vention is pure subterfuge.
Nevertheless, there is good authority for this result in the early
Supreme Court decisions on ancillary jurisdiction which were
based upon a necessity for federal jurisdiction in order to avoid
injustice to absent interested parties.71 But those cases involved
interests in property which was in the custody or under the con-
68. Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 109, 110 (1966).
69. (a) Persons to be Joined if Feasible. A person who is sub-ject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the
court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall bejoined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete re-
lief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so
situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties sub-ject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or other-
wise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (a).
70. (b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder not Feasible.
If a person as described in subdivision (a) (1)-(2) hereof cannot
be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and
good conscience the action should proceed among the parties be-
fore it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being thus re-
garded as indispensable. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (b).
71. See Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884); Freeman v. Howe, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
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trol of a federal court,72 so that no state court could protect the
absent party's interest. Rule 24 (a) (2) is not so limited to instances
of "exclusive" federal jurisdiction, 73 but it is premised on the need
to protect the unrepresented interests of an absent person.
It is the prejudicial impact of a judgment rendered in the ab-
sence of the "dispensable" intervener of right which makes his
claim or defense truly ancillary to the controversy between the
original parties. But the claim or defense of an intervener who is
indispensable is certainly no less ancillary to the original contro-
versy. The inconsistent treatment of the two persons must be
explained upon some other basis.
The basis of distinction is the one previously alluded to, i.e., the
difference between those who must be original parties and those
who should be if feasible. When the intervening party is indis-
pensable the court lacks jurisdiction not only over his claim or de-
fense but also over the claims and defenses of the original named
parties. 74 Hence, there is no existing controversy over which the
court has jurisdiction and to which the intervener's claim or de-
fense may be ancillary. When, on the other hand, the intervener
is merely conditionally necessary to the determination of the con-
troversy between the original parties, the court has jurisdiction
over a pending suit to which it may attach intervener's claim or
defense.
The difference then is fundamentally between jurisdiction over
the original claims and over additional, subsequent claims or de-
72. As late as 1925, the Supreme Court said,
[N]o controversy can be regarded as dependent or ancillary un-
less it has direct relation to property or assets actually or con-
structively drawn into the court's possession or control by the
principal suit.
Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).
73. Prior to the 1966 amendment, Rule 24(a) provided in part for
intervention of right ". . . when the applicant is so situated as to be ad-
versely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property which
is in the custody or subject to the control or disposition of the court or an
officer thereof." It was during that era that the link between intervention
of right and ancillary jurisdiction was forged.
Prof. Moore even concedes ancillary jurisdiction over permissive inter-
vention in in rem actions. See 3B J. MooRE, FEnaL PRACICE f 24.18[1]
(2d ed. 1969).
74. Under the revised Rule 19, there is no real absence of jurisdiction
over the original claim and parties, there is simply a decision to declinejurisdiction. See note 70, supra.
fenses. This is the same point of distinction between pendent and
'ancillary jurisdiction, the former applying only to claims asserted
in the complaint and the latter applying only to those asserted in
subsequent pleadings or procedures. Thus the accepted applica-
tions of ancillary jurisdiction do not lead inevitably to the invoca-
tion of pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases. The requirement of
complete diversity as to the original claims and parties still stands.
The cases refusing ancillary jurisdiction over claims in interven-
tion as of right by indispensable parties because it would constitute
an improper circumvention of the jurisdictional limitation on join-
der of original claims and parties are impressive authority for re-
jection of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases, for
the same jurisdictional limitations are avoided when pendent juris-
diction is invoked in a diversity case. In fact, the evasion is even
more blatant in the case of pendent jurisdiction because it is used
to permit actual original joinder. Acceptance of the doctrine of
pendent jurisdiction where diversity is lacking as to the pendent
claims is nothing less than a rejection of the rule of complete di-
versity.
On a similar rationale, the courts almost unanimously require a
permissive intervener under Rule 24(b) (2) 75 to satisfy the ordi-
nary jurisdictional requirements.76 Professor Moore has explained
the result in this way:
However, where intervention is sought to present a claim or de-
fense in an in personam action and the only basis therefor is a
common question of law or fact, there is no reason to permit the
intervener's rights to be litigated if they could not have been, had
the intervener been joined as an original party plaintiff or de-
fendant. Procedurally, it may be desirable to permit the inter-
vention and perhaps Congress should act to allow joinder where
there is jurisdiction over one of the claims. But, until Congress
acts, it would constitute an undue expansion of federal jurisdiction
to dispense with independent jurisdictional requirements. 77
In summary, then, there is a consistent interpretation of § 1332
and its predecessor general diversity provisions as requiring com-
plete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants. The only excep-
tions to this rule as to original actions are statutory, indicating a
75. (b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application any-
one may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a stat-
ute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene;
or (2) when an auplicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common....
Ancillary jurisdiction exists as to intervention under Rule 24(b) (1) by
virtue of the statutory right. This constitutes another statutory exception
to the requirement of complete diversity.
76. See WRIGHT & MILLER § 1917, note 58, supra.
77. See 3B J. MooRE, FEmERAL PRA7CECn 24.18[1] (2d ed. 1969).
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Congressional acquiescence in the judicial construction of § 1332.
The apparent exception of class actions is nothing more than an
application of the general rule to the representatives as the parties
litigant. As to non-original claims or defenses in intervention, al-
though they be truly ancillary, the rule of complete diversity does
apply if the intervention is permissive only, or if the intervener
would be an indispensable party, because intervention is merely
delayed joinder and should meet the original tests for jurisdiction.
Ancillary jurisdiction is accorded to claims of intervention as of
right by nonindispensable parties although this seems inconsistent
with Rule 19.
Thus one is led to the conclusion that so long as the Supreme
Court persists in its interpretation of the general diversity statute
as requiring all parties on one side of the dispute be completely
diverse from all parties on the opposing side, pendent jurisdiction
is not appropriate as to claims by or against non-diverse persons.
3. Policy Considerations
In dealing with the issue of pendent jurisdiction, the courts are
confronted with an apparent clash between the fact that the fed-
eral courts are courts of limited jurisdiction whose powers have
been specifically prescribed by Congress and the desire to achieve
judicial economy, convenience and fairness to parties despite con-
fining jurisdictional limitations. The Supreme Court has said that
the justification for the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction "lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to liti-
gants."78 These same considerations led the Court to approve an-
cillary or dependent jurisdiction over the claims of non-diverse
parties in actions in rem so that in disposing of property in the
control of the federal court the rights of all interested persons
could be protected.7 9 Ancillary jurisdiction also has been invoked
when necessary to preserve the effectiveness of the court's judg-
78. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
79. E.g., Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884); Freeman v. Howe,
65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
The principle is. that a bill filed on the equity side of the court to
restrain or regulate judgments or suits at law in the same court,
and thereby prevent injustice, or an inequitable advantage under
mesne or final process, is not an original suit, but ancillary and
dependent, supplementary merely to the original suit, out of
which it had arisen, and is maintained without reference to the
citizenship or residence of the parties. Freeman v. Howe, supra
at 460.
ment. 0 Those early decisions blossomed into the modern doctrine
of ancillary jurisdiction so plainly rooted in considerations of judi-
cial economy, convenience and fairness to parties.81
Whenever two claims exist which arise out of a single transac-
tion or occurrence and depend for their proof on essentially the
same facts, the judicial economy in having a single trial in one
court rather than two trials in different courts is patent. Likewise,
a single trial is more convenient for the witnesses who need ap-
pear only once and for the party who is prosecuting or defending
both claims and who need appear in, pay for and endure the anx-
iety of only one trial. On the other hand, the non-diverse defend-
ant would only have to defend once in any event and might be
inconvenienced by having to appear in a federal court more distant
from his home than the appropriate state court. As for fairness,
trial of the combined claims avoids the risk of inconsistent determi-
nations of fact or law which might result in double liability 2 or a
loss of contribution or indemnity to defendant,8 3 or in failure of the
plaintiff to recover against either of two defendants at least one
of whom must logically be liable.
It is to achieve these advantages that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure encourage liberal joinder of claims, parties and reme-
dies.84 But the Rules themselves provide that they "shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts .... 85 The question becomes whether the full
accomplishment of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to
parties is inconsistent with the limits of federal jurisdiction.
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court went di-
rectly to the Constitution as the source of the judicial "power" to
entertain pendent state law claims.8 6 Thus they relegated the
statutory grants of federal claim jurisdiction to the role of deter-
mining whether the case could get into federal court in the first
place. This willingness to deal with state law issues when they
are connected with matters of federal concern reaches back to Os-
born v. U.S. Bank,87 where the Court said:
80. E.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
81. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouRTs § 9; Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and
the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D.-27 (1963).
82. See, e.g., Borror v. Sharon Steel Co., 327 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1964).
83. Cf. Hipp v. U.S., 313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (Federal Tort
Claims Act).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 18-20, 23-24, 42. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
725 n.13 (1966).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
86. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
87. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power
of the Union is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient
of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the
Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions
of fact or of law may be involved in it.88
This authority to hear entire cases is necessary in order to assure
the ability of the federal courts to engage in construction of fed-
eral law, "a subject of vital importance to the government."8 9
What the Supreme Court has indicated in Osborn is that the fed-
eral courts have a unique interest and, so far as the federal gov-
ernment is concerned, a vital role in the interpretation and appli-
cation of federal law. That special interest will not readily be
forsworn. Of course Congress has provided that this jurisdiction
will, as to ordinary federal questions, be shared concurrently with
the states;90 but when a litigant has properly chosen to bring his
case to a federal forum, the federal court should not hesitate to
take it.
Given this justifiable preference for a federal forum for federal
questions, considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fair-
ness to parties do indeed weigh heavily in favor of extending pend-
ent jurisdiction to related state law claims even when they are
asserted by or against persons not parties to the federal claim.91
Otherwise parties seeking those advantages would be forced to
resort to the state courts to achieve them, taking the federal ques-
tions with them. In cases like Hum, or Gibbs where the federal
jurisdiction over the federal claim is exclusive so that the litigants
cannot take their entire case to a state forum, the argument for
pendent jurisdiction over the non-federal claims is even stronger,
as the only alternative possible is dual trials with all of the attend-
ant waste and potential prejudice.92
There is no such vital federal concern in providing the forum
for diversity cases.9 3 Indeed, serious debate exists as to whether
88. Id. at 821.
89. Id. at 820.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
91. See Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-The Problem of "Pendenting
Parties," 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5-14 (1972); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and
Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HAiv. L. REV. 657 (1968).
92. See, e.g., Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152 (E.D.N.Y. 1970)
(Federal Tort Claims Act).
93. There may be federal defenses or other federal law issues in such
the federal courts should entertain diversity jurisdiction at all.94
Congress, while retaining diversity jurisdiction, has acted in recent
years to restrict its availability. 5 The American Law Institute
has proposed still further reduction in the availability of general
diversity jurisdiction.9" The Supreme Court has evolved the doc-
trine of abstention to avoid deciding novel or difficult questions of
state law,97  And the complete diversity rule has long functioned
to divert state-law cases to the state judicial systems.
With so much history evidencing a policy to avoid unnecessary
determination of state-law issues in the federal courts when they
are not bound up with federal issues, one is compelled to question
the wisdom of renouncing the complete diversity rule-in the guise
of adopting pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases. The consider-
ations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to parties
which weigh so heavily in favor of pendent jurisdiction in federal
question cases, hardly seem to counterbalance the burden and in-
convenience to the federal courts in having to wrestle with prob-
lems of state law in instances of only state concern and the pos-
sible unfairness to the parties through incorrect interpretation or
applications of state laws. This is especially so since the ordinary
economy, convenience and fairness of a single trial of identical is-
sues, which is the apparent purpose of pendent jurisdiction, are
generally available through joinder of claims in the state courts.98
Unfortunately, a party with a federally cognizable claim may
persist in his choice of a federal forum for that claim, leaving the
other related claims for state court adjudication. The obvious re-
sult is dual trials and judicial dis-economy. But that may be a
price worth paying in order to retain the complete diversity rule
which will ordinarily cause the entire controversy to be taken to a
state court. Likewise, the inconvenience which occurs from an
insistence on dual trials in distinct forums should not unduly con-
cern the federal court.
cases, but they are presumably the exception. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has not interpreted these to bring a case within the federal question
jurisdiction. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911).
94. Citations to contending authorities are collected in C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL
Courts § 23, nn.16-18.
95. E.g., the raising of the jurisdictional amount to $10,000, 28 U.S.C.§ 1332(a), 72 Stat. 415 (1958). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c), 72 Stat. 415
(1958), 78 Stat. 445 (1964); 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (b), 62 Stat. 937 (1948).
96. ALI Snmy § 1302.
97. See C. WRIGHT FEDERAL COURTS § 53.
98. More than one-half of the states have adopted the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and many of the other states have liberal joinder rules as
well. Availability of service of process on foreign defendants is gener-
[VOL. 11: 296, 1974] Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
It is to avoid possible unfairness due to separate trials of related
claims that the federal courts may justly contemplate exercising
pendent jurisdiction. But a plaintiff who is precluded from prose-
cuting in a single federal suit two related claims against a diverse
and a non-diverse defendant may remove the prejudice by taking
both his claims to a state court. The same self-help is available to
him when the prejudice is due to the inability of another party
plaintiff to join the suit because of lack of diversity.
Self-help is likewise available to the omitted non-diverse person,
plaintiff or defendant who "claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and...
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest .... 99
It is in just such circumstances that the federal courts invoke an-
cillary jurisdiction to permit intervention as of right by the preju-
diced party.100 Should he prove to be an "indispensable" party
under Rule 19(b), the same prejudice is avoided by the resulting
dismissal of the entire action.101 The same invocation of Rule
19(b) should protect the defendant who finds himself in federal
court and "subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, mul-
tiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of [an absent,
non-diverse party's] claimed interest."'102
Hence, the problem of potential unfairness due to inability to
join claims by or against non-diverse parties may be dealt with by
the federal courts in either of two ways. They may make freer
use of Rule 19 (b) so as to force the bringing of all related claims
in state courts, where interests in convenience will likely induce
joinder of the claims if rules on compulsory joinder do not compel
it, or they may invoke pendent jurisdiction. 0 3 The first alterna-
tive results in fewer state law claims in federal courts, and the
ally co-extensive in state and federal courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(a) and (f).
Where a party suffers demonstrable discrimination at the hands of a
state court he may have a remedy through review by the Supreme Court.
99. FEn. R. Crv. P. 24 (a).
100. See text accompanying notes 64-67, supra.
101. See text accompanying note 65, supra.
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (a).
103. See generally Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Fed-
eral Courts, 20 STAN. L. REv. 262, 270-86 (1968). The author suggests
that the broad test of Gibbs is unsupported in precedent or in policy and
argues that pendent jurisdiction should be exercised only where the
court will necessarily decide the pendent claim or where there is a demon-
strated need for it in order to avoid injustice.
second opens the federal courts to more parties and more issues.
The former choice seems clearly to be more consistent with the
recent congressional attempts to restrict federal diversity jurisdic-
tion. In either event, the interests of judicial economy, convenience
and fairness to the parties are substantially served. The actual
choice made will inevitably depend upon the decision-maker's view
of the value or need for an "unbiased" federal forum for contro-
versies between citizens of different states.
Perhaps the most important question is who should make this
choice. Congress has the authority to prescribe the jurisdiction
of the lower federal courts.10 4 But the courts interpret those pre-
scriptions, and in doing so have created the doctrines of ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction as well as the rule of complete diversity.
The answer to the question may be indicated by Snyder v. Har-
ris.10 5 The majority, over strong dissent, took the position that
only Congress could change the long established rule against ag-
gregation of separate and distinct claims:
Where Congress has consistently re-enacted its prior statutory lan-
guage for more than a century and a half in the face of a settled
interpretation of that language, it is perhaps not entirely realistic
to designate the resulting rule a "judge-made formula."
If there is a present need to expand the jurisdiction of [the federal]
courts we cannot overlook the fact that the Constitution specifi-
cally vests that power in Congress, not in the courts.100
If the Court would not alter the non-aggregation rule which it
traced back to 1832, it is doubtful that it would abrogate the com-
plete diversity rule in which Congress has acquiesced since 1806.107
B. Amount in Controversy
From the very beginning Congress has imposed an amount in
controversy requirement on federal diversity jurisdiction. 08 The
purposes of such a limitation are to lessen federal interference in
what are matters of primarily state concern and to reduce the
caseload of the federal courts. 0 9 However, since the same require-
104. See note 27, supra.
105. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
106. Id. at 339, 341-42.
107. Congress has shown itself to be capable of making exceptions when
it desires. See 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958).
108. The Judiciary Act of 1789 first set the amount at $500. 1 Stat. 73, 78(1789). It was subsequently raised to $2,000 in 1887. 24 Stat. 552 (1887).
It was raised again to $3,000 in 1911. 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911). The cur-
rent jurisdictional amount is $10,000 as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
109. Note, The Federal Jurisdictional Amount and Rule 20 Joinder of
Parties: Aggregation of Claims, 53 MINN. L. REv. 94 (1968).
[VOL. 11: 296, 1974] Pendent Jurisdiction in Diversity Cases
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ment is imposed on general federal question cases today,"10 it ap-
pears that the primary objective of the amount in controversy lim-
itation is to relieve the federal court dockets."'
This policy obviously is advanced by the universal refusal to
permit several plaintiffs asserting separate claims, each below the
jurisdictional minimum, to aggregate their claims. 12 Since none
of them could sue in a federal court individually, no good reason
appears to permit them to sue there as a group. Certainly, the
federal courts have no greater interest in hearing these claims just
because of their numerousness. In Snyder v. Harris,"3 the Su-
preme Court recently reaffirmed this traditional prohibition
against aggregation of separate claims even as to class actions.
That case held that the individual claims of the class members
could not be aggregated to achieve the jurisdictional amount, at
least where none of the claims of the named representatives met
the $10,000 minimum.
The same non-aggregation principle has been applied to prevent
a plaintiff with a lesser claim from getting into federal court by
joining with another plaintiff having a claim above the jurisdic-
tional minimum.114 But this is a very different situation from or-
dinary aggregation and should be distinguished from it. First, at
least one of the properly joined separate claims qualifies for fed-
eral jurisdiction. Hence, it may stay in the federal court and
there will be no reduction in the caseload as is intended by the
non-aggregation rule. Second, there will now be at least two
trials of the same issues-one in the federal court on the larger
claim and one in the state court on the smaller claim. The result
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
111. The most often quoted statement of Congressional intent behind the
current amount in controversy requirement is:
[T]hat the amount should be fixed at a sum of money that will
make jurisdiction available in all substantial controversies where
other elements of federal jurisdiction are present. The jurisdic-
tional amount should not be so high as to convert the federal
courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away
their time in the trial of petty controversies. S. REP. No. 1830, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958).
112. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CouiTs § 36.
113. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
114. E.g., Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973); Clark
v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th
Cir. 1969); and cases cited in 1 W. BARRON & H. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE
AND PROCEDURE § 24, n.56.3 (Wright ed. 1960).
is that the burden on the federal court is not substantially re-
duced, while the burden on the judicial system as a whole is dou-
bled. In addition, there is the possibility of inconsistent determina-
tions on identical questions of law and fact. In the case of strict
aggregation, on the other hand, the entire litigation is simply
shifted from the federal court to the state court with no apparent
cost to judicial efficiency. Third, proceeding to try the larger claim
will necessarily inject the federal court into a matter of state con-
cern anyway, so the court might as well "go whole hog."1n 5
These considerations of judicial economy and convenience to the
parties have been leading more and more federal courts to invoke
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction so as to try large and small
related claims in a single action." 6 The Supreme Court's decisions
in Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc." 7 and Snyder v. Harris"8 were impedi-
ments in the path of this judicial development, but the recent de-
cision of Zahn v. International Paper Co." 9 appears to have struck
it a death blow.
In Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc.,120 numerous individuals, co-part-
nerships and corporations joined in bringing suit to enjoin the en-
forcement of a California statute which imposed licensing fees of
$15 per car on automobiles driven or towed into the state for pur-
poses of sale. The plaintiffs were engaged in such business. The
bill of complaint alleged generally, and the trial court found, that
the amount involved "in this litigation" was in excess of $3,000,
115. See, Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 512 (1973) (dis-
senting opinion).
116. Decisions by U.S. Circuit: Third Circuit: Jacobson v. Atlantic City
Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968); Greene v. Basti, 391 F.2d 892 (3d Cir.
1968); Wilson v. American Chain & Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966);
Townsend v. Quality Court Motels, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1140 (D. Del. 1972);
Morris v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Fourth
Circuit: Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1000 (1972), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 1118 (1973); Bishop v. Byrne, 265 F.
Supp. 460 (S.D.W. Va. 1967); Sixth Circuit: Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory
Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); General Research, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Employers' Ins. Co., 289 F. Supp. 735 (W.D. Mich. 1968); Wiggs v.
City of Tullahoma, 261 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1966); Raybould v. Man-
cini-Fattore Co., 186 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Seventh Circuit:
Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 261 F. Supp. 905
(N.D. Ill. 1966); Eighth Circuit: Walstad v. Univ. of Minn. Hosps., 442
F.2d 634 (8th Cir. 1971) (dubious application); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Lucas v .Seagrave Corp., 277 F. Supp.
338 (D. Minn. 1967); Dixon v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis,
276 F. Supp. 96 (D. Minn. 1967); Ninth Circuit, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v
Jeppeson & Co., 344 F. Supp. 1381 (D. Nev. 1972).
117. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
118. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
119. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
120. 306 U.S. 583 (1939).
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the then jurisdictional amount. The Supreme Court raised the
jurisdictional issue sua sponte and proceeded to dismiss the suit
as to all plaintiffs-appellees except Paul Gray, Inc. The Court ac-
cepted the allegations in the bill of complaint indicating that Paul
Gray, Inc. would pay more than $3,000 per year in statutory fees.
The Court pointed out that each plaintiff maintained its own
separate business, and thus there was no joint common interest
in the subject matter of the action. It then stated the "familiar
rule" against aggregation of "separate and distinct demands" in a
single, and continued:
Proper practice requires that where each of several plaintiffs is
bound to establish the jurisdictional amount with respect to his
own claim, the suit should be dismissed as to those who fail to
show that the requisite amount is involved. Otherwise an ap-
pellate court could be called on to sustain a decree in favor of a
plaintiff who had not shown that his claim involved the jurisdic-
tional amount, even though the suit was dismissed on the merits
as to the other plaintiffs who had established the jurisdictional
amount for themselves. 121
The result of the Clark case, in light of the retention of the ade-
quate claim by Paul Gray, Inc., might be viewed as a refusal to
apply the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to separate claims by
multiple parties. The Court actually characterized each separate
and distinct claim as a "separate controversy"'122 for purposes of
determining the jurisdictional amount. The quoted passage from
the Court's opinion highlights the Court's insistence that each
plaintiff who seeks to enjoy a federal forum for his individual
claim should come within the federal jurisdictional limits.
On the other hand, it must be pointed out that the Court did not
consider the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in its opinion. Indeed,
as enunciated in Hum v. Oursler,123 the doctrine could not apply
where there were two distinct causes of action asserted between
the same parties. It would have been unthinkable to apply it to
claims between different parties. 24 After Gibbs, however, the un-
thinkable has been thought.
121. Id. at 590.
122. Id. at 589.
123. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). See text accompanying notes 7-14, supra.
124. Another possible point on which to distinguish the Clark case is
the fact that it was a common question of law, i.e., the constitutionality of
the California statute as applied to their various business operations,
which held the plaintiffs' claims together. The subsequent Gibbs formu-
Whatever the vulnerability of Clark to historical distinguish-
ments might be, its significance has been enhanced by the recent
decisions of Snyder v. Harris125 and Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 20 in which the majority opinions made extended reference
to it.
Snyder involved review of two attempted class action suits in
which a single plaintiff sued on behalf of herself or himself and
others similarly situated. In neither case did the sole representa-
tive have a claim for $10,000, but each representative sought to
aggregate the several claims of the class members to achieve the
jurisdictional amounts. The Court refused to permit aggregation,
saying:
Aggregation has been permitted only (1) in cases in which a single
plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or more claims against a single
defendant and (2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite to
enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and
undivided interest. 27
If the Court defines aggregation to include all attempts to assert
claims which individually fall below the jurisdictional minimum,
then this purportedly inclusive enumeration of proper applications
of aggregation precludes aggregation, or pendent jurisdiction, in
the situation under discussion-where one plaintiff's claim meets
the jurisdictional amount requirements and another's does not.
That this is the Court's definition is confirmed by its decision in
Zahn.
En Zahn, suit had been instituted by a group of Vermont land
owners on behalf of themselves and 200 others owning land front-
ing on Lake Champlain. They sought damages from International
Paper Company, a New York corporation, for allegedly polluting
the lake and injuring the surrounding properties. The suit was
brought as a diversity action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The
claim of each of the named plaintiffs met the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount, but the District Court found that not every individual
member of the class had suffered damages in excess of $10,000.
On the authority of Snyder v. Harris, the District Court dismissed
the class action saying that it had no jurisdiction over the lesser
claims and that no class of homeowners with claims in excess of
$10,000 could be adequately defined. 28 The Second Circuit af-
lation of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine emphasizes a "common nucleus
of operative fact" from which the joined claims must arise.
125. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
126. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
127. 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).
128. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
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firmed in a divided opinion.129 The Supreme Court affirmed as
well.
The majority's opinion in Zahn is based on the the decision in Sny-
der and adds little to it by way of analysis. It does make it clear,
however, that the non-aggregation rule is not limited to class ac-
tions and that it prevents appending lesser claims to sufficient
ones:
"The doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be ag-
gregated was never, and is not now, based upon the categories of
old Rule 23 or of any rule of procedure. That doctrine is based
rather upon this Court's interpretation of the statutory phrase
'matter in controversy.'" [Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) ]
This rule plainly mandates not only that there may be no aggre-
gation and that the entire case must be dismissed where none ,of
the plaintiffs claims more than $10,000 but also requires that any
plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from
the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient
claims.'3 0
It seems in the present state of the law, pendent jurisdiction is
not available to permit joinder of individual claims below the
jurisdictional minimum with related larger ones. This conclusion
is reinforced by the fact that the three dissenting Justices in Zahn
strongly asserted a theory of ancillary or pendent jurisdiction. 13 1
CONCLUSION
While there are no constitutional barriers to the exercise of pend-
ent jurisdiction in diversity cases, there are some high hurdles of
statutory construction and history to overcome. The two principal
impediments are the complete diversity requirement and the rule
against aggregating individual claims.
Courts have been able to avoid these obstacles by the exercise
of ancillary jurisdiction when the non-diverse or inadequate claims
are presented after the courts' jurisdiction has been properly in-
voked originally. Thus they will entertain compulsory counter-
129. Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
130. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505, 511 (1973).
131. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct. at 512 (dissenting opinion). The dissent also
points out the anomaly that only the citizenship of the representatives will
be considered to establish diversity which is fundamentally a constitu-
tional requirement, but all of the class members must satisfy the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement which is purely statutory. Id. at -, 94 S. Ct.
at 516.
claims, cross-claims, third-party complaints, and claims in inter-
vention which relate to the same transaction or occurrences as the
original claim, even though diversity or the jurisdictional amount
or both are lacking as to these non-original claims. The result is
justified as promoting the interests of judicial economy, conven-
ience and fairness to the parties. The ordinary jurisdictional limi-
tations in regard to citizenship and amount in controversy are cir-
cumvented by holding that they apply to and are satisfied with re-
spect to the original claims alone; once the court has acquired ju-
risdiction of a federally cognizable action, it may proceed to ad-
judicate the entire controversy.
Attempts to attain the same judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to parties through use of pendent jurisdiction in diversity
cases will be frustrated, because the rationale which avoids the ap-
plications of citizenship and amount in controversy limitations to
ancillary claims leads to a direct confrontation between those limi-
tations and pendent claims. Pendent claims are original claims.
Therefore, they are subject to the restrictions on original federal
diversity jurisdiction. Any other result is obvious sleight of hand.
To permit appending of claims between non-diverse parties is
nothing short of overruling the complete diversity rule. Append-
ing claims below the jurisdictional amount to larger ones, on the
other hand, might have been supported by distinguishing such a
case from one of strict aggregation, i.e., where none of the joined
claims individually meets the minimum amount requirements.
But the Supreme Court has apparently precluded that approach by
its decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,' 3 2 that the claim of
every member of the class in a Rule 23 (b) (3) action must meet the
jurisdictional amount. Furthermore, the Court stated that if
change in the non-aggregation rule were to be made, it would
have to be made by Congress. Presumably the Court would leave it
to Congress also to alter the even more venerable complete di-
versity rule.
Appealing arguments can be made for pendent jurisdiction in
diversity actions, especially to avoid potential unfairness to parties.
They must now be made to Congress rather than the courts.
132. - U.S. -, 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
133. The American Law Institute has proposed a limited application of
pendent jurisdiction in diversity cases when multiple claims are made by
members of the same family living in the same household. ALI STUnY
§ 1301 (e). This is a recurring fact pattern in the cases to date which have
invoked pendent jurisdiction, but no suitable reason can be given for so
restricting the proposal. As written it creates difficult problems of inter-
pretation. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute,
36 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1968).
